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Abstract
In this paper the Signalling approach to the explanation of wage
di®erentials is analyzed both under a microeconomic and a macroeco-
nomic viewpoint. Departuring from the classical Spence's model, the
introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to redis-
tributive e®ects among workers and ¯rms. Moreover the existence of
factors related both to local and to parental externalities greately reduce
the informative power of education about individual ability.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between individual investment in education and earning has
been extensively analyzed both from an empirical and a theoretical point of
view and it plays a central role in the debate around human capital ac-
cumulation, but not only, since, in general, better educated people exibits
qualitative features particularly attracting for ¯rms. As an example they have
lower propensities to quit or to be absent, are less likely to smoke, drinks or
use illecit drugs and are generally healthier1. These characteristics are not
directly observed by the ¯rm but, according to the signalling approach, they
can be inferred from the chosen lenght of schooling. But what is important
to us, is that individuals attending succesfully a higher lenght of schooling
are characterized by a particular ability which makes them valuable to the
¯rms; the above quoted features are consequence of such a higher ability or
"quality". In other words, education provides a "signal" about the degree
of skill characterizing an individual randomly drawn from the population.
The latter is the main focus of the pioneeristic Spence's work on Market
Signalling and our departure point. The main idea is quite intuitive: at the
birth, each individual is endowed with a given level of "intrinsic ability" ac-
cording to some exogenous (natural?) distribution; high-skill individuals are
more productive, when employed as workers, than low-skill ones and such
heterogeneity has to be accomplished by a di®erent salary. There exist hence
two possible explanation to the nexus education - wages; according to the
¯rst one - the human capital theory - individuals acquire their productivity
staying at school longer. In the second one - the signalling approach - educa-
tion provides a signal about the individual ability, according to the idea that
a longer stay at school is less costly, in e®ort term, for a more able individual.
As in a sort of Darwinian mechanism, only more able individuals survive to
a longer staying at school with success.
In the signalling approach, the nexus education - individual ability is
exactly reversed w.r.t. the human capital theory; in the latter, the individual
productivity is induced by a longer permanence at school while in the former
a high education level is a consequence of a higher individual ability. The
two sides of the coin are not necessarily rivals, and likely they are not, but
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nonetheless it is extremely hard to identify which of them is predominating in
explaning the earnings distribution. The empirical analysis is not very useful
in such a context, as the cited work of Andrew Weiss underlines, because
of the non-observability of the individual ability di®erences. A positive and
statistically signi¯cative relationship between wage and education can be
interpreted as the sign that the signalling device, rather than the human
capital one, is at work; in such a case the estimated coe±cient would measure
the private, rather than the social, return to education.
The signalling approach hence takes into consideration the "microeco-
nomic" or individual point of view of the question, stressing on the "strategic
interaction" between individual and ¯rm on the job market and for such a
reason the more conceivable methodology in order to analyze the matter is
the Signalling Games approach. In fact when an individual meets a ¯rm on
the job market, the latter does not know, a priori, what type of worker it
is facing, if a high or a low skill individual, nor it can expect the individual
"reveals" voluntarily her type, since less-skilled individuals strictly prefer "to
mime" skillful types in order to get higher wages. Hence an "asymmetric in-
formation game" is at the work here; there is a player (the worker) who has
a greater information set than her opponent (the ¯rm), i.e. the individual
knows her type but not so for the ¯rm.
In this paper we shall try to analyze the robustness of the signalling
approach and if it could e®ectively provide a well established explanation
to wage di®erentials. Our analysis departs from the idea that in the sig-
nalling approach, hereafter identi¯ed with the Spence's model and following
re¯nements, it is implicitly assumed that individuals have free access to any
amount of education they wish and only a subjective reason (the personal
aversion towards education) "constraints" the individual choice. But if edu-
cation is costly, and if individual has to face a budget constraint, is it still
possible to acquire the necessary education level signalling properly own pro-
ductivity? The answer, in general, depends on the magnitude of education
necessary to such a goal. In the Spence's model, education has a subjec-
tive cost - the individual e®ort - but not a pecuniary one; we need to assume
that education is provided in a free way by the scholastic system. Viceversa if
education is costly, because we can not assume a completely free-fees scholas-
tic context, then the above mentioned problem can arise several questions.
Moreover when we "switch" from the microeconomic to the macroeconomic
point of view of the question we have to take into consideration others fac-
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individual ability.
The article is composed as follows: in paragraph 2 a review of the Spence's
model is provided, with a particular emphasis on the signalling games lan-
guage. It will be underlined the "separating property" of the solution, ob-
tained by suitable re¯nements of the Nash equilibrium, due to Cho-Kreps,
1987, and Banks-Sobel, 1987.
In paragraph 3, we will use the same framework but with a "rationed
agent" who can not properly signal her quality to the ¯rm. We shall see that
a separating equilibrium is still possible, although pooling equilibria are also
possible, but with a particular result about the way according to which more
able individuals are remunerated. Finally in paragraph 4, we look for the
macroeconomic implications of the signalling approach, considering external
factors a®ecting the signal quality. Conclusions follows.
2 The Spence's model: a review.
Since it is my intention to keep the discussion as intuitive as possible I am
going to analyze the simplest case of signalling game. There exist two "types"
of worker with di®erent ability indexed by the integer t; viz low-skill (t = 1)
and high-skill (t = 2). The opponent is a ¯rm2 asking for the services of
the worker. Workers know their type but not so the ¯rm; the latter observes
only the education level chosen by the worker. Both players are optimiser:
workers want to maximize their utility function choosing an education level
e 2 (0;1)3, given their type, t, and the expected wage w paid by the ¯rm.
The latter is a pro¯t-maximizer, hence pays a wage equal to the worker
productivity which in turn depends on individual ability. But the ¯rm does
not know such a characteristic; it can only set-up a beliefs system about it on
the basis of the observed education level. For such a reason workers choose
the education level performing conjectures on what will be the ¯rm response
(wage) to the chosen education level. So both players, ¯rm and workers, have
to perform their choices basing on some beliefs about the opponent strategy.
Before to describe in detail the property of the beliefs-system, we return
2We assume for simplicity a single representative ¯rm, but the result does not change
if we assume two ¯rms competing a la Bertrand.
3In reality we do not need to assume the real non-negative line as support for education;
we can use a borelian-subset with a suitable ¯nite measure. Nevertheless the assumption
e 2 (0;1) underlines the lack of constraints in the maximizing program.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 5
to the workers preferences. For each type t = 1;2, arguments of the utility
function are wage, w, and education, e, so both types can select a bundle
(w;e) in the <+ - <+ space. Individuals are characterized by a complete,
re°exive and transitive preferences-system on the bundles (w;e) and so order-
ing is possible. This property allows us to work with a continuous, concave
utility function which is strictly increasing in w and strictly decreasing in
e. Moreover, since type 1 is more "education-averse" the curvature of her
utility function is in any point greater than type 2.
This set of assumptions about preferences can be summarized by two
families of indi®erence curves in the (w;e) space, one for each type. Such
curves are continuous and increasing, but the curves of type 1 are in any point
steeper than type 2, so, when they cross, they cross once. This single-crossing
property is crucial for the result, but it seems to me quite reasonable, since
it describes the subjective diversity characterizing the two types4. Finally,
utility is increasing from South-East to North-West in the (w;e) space. We
shall ¯nd very useful analyze the equilibrium by these indi®erence curves.
Now we return to describe the game at a less general level. With t = 1;2,
we identify types; p(t) < 1 means the fraction of type t in the workers popu-
lation and it represents the (prior) probability to engage a type t in absence
of additional information; this is common knowledge. Type-1 workers have
a e productive value for the ¯rms and, likewise, type- 2 individuals value is
2e so that, in equilibrium, ¯rm pays w(e) = e to less-skilled individuals and
w(e) = 2e to more able ones. The problem is to resume such a result in the
asymmetric information context, i.e. when ¯rm does not know a prior what
type is facing. However, it is clear that the ¯rm is never willing to pay a
wage above 2e and, likewise, workers do not accept a wage below e: In other
words, it is common knowledge that e · w(e) · 2e:
Each type is characterized by a conditional probability distribution ½(ejt);
the latter represents the probability that a type t chooses e as education
level. The ¯rm responds to the education level e following some beliefs-
system ¹(tje) which represent the probability, assigned by the ¯rm, that the
observed education level e comes from a t type. On this belief, ¯rm chooses
its best-reply, viz the wage w. It remains to de¯ne how the ¯rm sets up the
4This property has several others implications, not last the fact that "the supports of
the signals (education in our case) sent by various type are increasing in the type. This
does not preclude pooling, but a pool must be an interval of types pooling on a single signal,
with any type in the interior of the interval sending only the pooling signal." (Kreps-Sobel,
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beliefs and the proposed solution is the following: for each education level






The (1) shows the conditional probability ¹(¢je) as a ratio between a joint
probability (numerator) and a marginal probability (denominator). It is
worth spending some word on it. The numerator is a joint probability since
it is the product of a marginal and a conditional probability; it represents the
probability that an individual t chooses the education level e; since p(t) is the
(marginal) probability to face a t-type and ½(ejt) is the probability that type
t chooses the education level e: The denominator represents the (marginal)
probability to choose an education level e whatever the type. According to
such an assumption about the way beliefs are generated, the expected wage
has to necessarily follow:
w(e) = ¹(1je)e + ¹(2je)2e (2)
As it is easy to check, e · w(e) · 2e: For example, if the ¯rm puts weight
zero to the fact that the observed education level e is coming from a type 2,
then ¹(2je) = 0; ¹(1je) = 1 and the ¯rm best reply is w = e5: Nevertheless
the (1) can be used only if ½(tje) 6= 0; t = 1;2, i.e. only for education levels
which are chosen, in equilibrium, by types.
For testing an equilibrium outcome robustness, we need to analyze "o®-
equilibrium" education levels for which the (1) does not hold, since denom-
inator is zero. We need hence a beliefs-system also for the o®-equilibrium
choice and in order to restrict out of equilibrium beliefs we shall use the
Cho-Kreps' Intuitive Criterion which, for a two types game, corresponds to
Banks-Sobel' Divinity.
The reader does not take fright at this esoteric terminology; it involves
only a certain dose of common-sense, as it will be clear in a while.
Now we are ready to show the game solution through the diagram in
Figure 1
5The reader familiar with games theory, should recognize that this is a sequential
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Figure 1 - A separating equilibrium
Such a ¯gure shows a "separating equilibrium" where type 1 chooses the ed-
ucation level e1 and type 2 chooses e2: Such a result is supported by beliefs
putting zero weight on the fact that education levels e < e0 come, in equi-
librium, by type 1, hence ¹(2je) = 0; ¹(1je) = 1 and the ¯rm "best reply"
is w = e 8e < e0; according to (2). Given such a ¯rm reply, type 1 selects
e1 which provides the ¯rst best to her; note in fact that in e1 the indi®er-
ence curve displays a tangency point with the ray w = e: Likely, the reader
is wondering: Why, in such an equilibrium, are we sure that any education
level above e0 reveals exactly type 2? The answer is quite simple: because
8e > e0 type 1 is worse o® than in equilibrium, i.e. in e1. As the diagram
shows indeed, such education levels lie under the indi®erence curve of type
1 characterizing the equilibrium, hence 8e > e0 type 1 is worse o® than the
equilibrium outcome. According to such reasoning, if ¯rm observes an edu-
cation level lying in this region it can put ¹(2je) = 1;¹(1je) = 0 and w = 2e;
according to (2).M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 8
For the sake of simplicity in the diagram I put the type 2 equilibrium
point in e2 but this is not a very e±cient solution, since type 2 is signalling
too much. It is easy to see that all education levels lying on the plotted
bold line along the 2e ray provide a better situation for type 2 since they
involve higher indi®erence curves; a rational agent characterized by this kind
of preferences should choose the highest possible curve compatible with the
separating condition, i.e. e = e0: In such a point in fact type 1 has a weak
incentive to deviate while type 2 has a strong one, and, according to the
Divinity criterion, we can prune the signal e0 from the type-1 message set.
Nevertheless it is clear that in the asymmetric information context we ob-
tain an over-signalling w.r.t. the full information context; in the latter type
2 would choose the education level which provides her a ¯rst best, viz at
the tangency point with the 2e ray. Given the preferences in Figure 1, such
education level would be cast under e0: In other words, the presence of asym-
metric information produces an over-signalling whose cost is paid by more
able individuals in term of a lower utility level.
Now we have to demonstre that only separating equilibria are possible in
such a game. Let us consider a point in the shaded region in Figure 16; this
region is above both indi®erence curves, hence it represents strictly preferred
bundles w.r.t. the equilibrium situation, yet it is not take into consideration
by the workers. In fact if the ¯rm had observed an education level lying
in this region, then it would not have could exclude any types since both
workers could gain by sending this signal. If we assume that types are drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution, i.e. p(1) = p(2) = 1=2; the more
reasonable beliefs-system is ¹(1je) = ¹(2je) = 1=27; then the ¯rm best reply
would be to o®er w = 1:5e (by the (2)). Workers are able to reply this
¯rm strategy and choose a common education point e 2 (e1;e0) on the mix-
line w = 1:5e, since this is the better choice in such a situation; in other
words seems that our original separating equilibrium collapses in a pooling
equilibrium; yet, this is a false statement. In fact in a pooling equilibrium
6It is worth stressing that these points are o®-equilibrium, hence we can not set up a
beliefs-system by the (1), viz we can not assume p(1)½(ej1)+p(2)½(ej2) > 0: We are going
to use the above mentioned Nash re¯nements in order to restrict beliefs.
7Such beliefs are coerent with the Bayes rule because if the observed level e were the
equilibrium result, then we necessarily should have ½(ej1) = ½(ej2) = 1 which, togheter
with the prior probability p(1) = p(2) = 1=2, provides exactly the above beliefs. Moreover
it is not by chance that the posterior probabilities (beliefs) matches the prior probabilities,
since, in absence of a newinformationon types, the Bayes rule provides no beliefs updating.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 9
type 2 is worse o® than in the separating one, since the pooling involves
lower indi®erence curves for type 2. Hence she has an incentive to departure
from the pooling equilibrium, by sending a higher signal in order to signal
properly herself, breaking down the pooling equilibrium; in such situation
the best strategy for type 1 is e1 since it can not mime a type 2.
Concluding, in the Spence's model only separating equilibria survives,
solving the informative problem thanks to a workers self-selection by the
mean of education. Despite education does not increase individual ability
at all, it provides the right signal for identifying the worker productivity.
The result provides a simple but powerful microeconomic theory justifying
a positive relationship between wage and education, which in turn hides a
positive relationship between wage and individual productivity.
3 A slightly di®erent game.
So far the story sounds quite standard. However, as pointed out in the intro-
duction, the Spence's model does not pose any pecuniary cost to education;
each type can choose an education level e 2 [0;1) without additional con-
straints other than we have seen in the previous paragraph. In other words,
we have to assume either education is entirely free or individuals are rich
enough for achieving the necessary education level.
In this paragraph we shall assume that education is costly (not only as
individual e®ort) and in order to analyze the e®ect of such an assumption
we introduce a third worker. The latter is a type 2 but with a di®erent
characteristic: she is poorer than the other workers, and in particular than
the typical type-2; we shall call, conventionally, this "rationed" agent as 21
and the non-rationed one as 22: The only di®erence between these types is in
the feasible education set, viz, while 22 selects e 2 [0;1), type 21 can choose
only in the e 2 [0; ¹ e] domain - with ¹ e < e0
8- because of her income constraint.
By so doing we restrict the feasible message set for player 21 to a compact
set with the upper bound less than the signalling threshold e0: We have now
to investigate how such an assumption can a®ect the previous section results;
we can distinguish two cases: in the ¯rst one ¹ e < e0 but ¹ e > e¤ and ¹ e < e¤
in the second one.
8The case ¹ e > e0 has not any reveleance to us, since it does not a®ect the standard
separating property.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 10
Figure 2
In the Spence's model, because of the kind of assumptions on the individ-
ual preferences we adopt, "high Sender (workers) types are stronger than low
ones; The higher t is, the more R (the ¯rm) is willing to pay. Consequently,
... any Sender type t would like R to believe that t=T (the highest type). ...
higher types are more willing to send higher signals than lower types"9. In
other words, in such a signalling game, the highest type - type 2 in our case -
is always better o® in a separating rather than in a pooling equilibrium, since
she can achieve a higher indi®erence curve. For such a reason, this kind of
sender prefers reaveling properly himself by the mean of education and lower
types try to mime, until possible, her behaviour. I hope the reader has not
di±cult to recognize that this is exactly the way in which we breaked down
the pooling equilibrium in the previous section: the highest type is always
willing to choose any necessary amount of education separating herself by
9Cho-Sobel, 1990, page 392.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 11
the lower ones.
When the highest individual is constrained to a compact message set, a
pooling equilibrium can arise only at the upper bound of the message set ;
this is one of the contributes of the Cho and Sobel article10. For a rigorous
demonstration of such a result the reader is urged upon reading the cited
article; nevertheless an intuitive justi¯cation can be provided on the basis
of the previous reasoning. Since the highest type always has an advantage
to separate, she will choose the maximum education level signalling herself
but such a value could be outside the feasible choice set. In such a case
the message set is not su±cient to separate workers, but the highest type
will use the maximum feasible education level in the tempative to signal her
productivity and in this way will be mimed by the lowest type. The ¯nal
result is a pooling equilibrium at the maximum feasible education level which
"survives" both the Intuitive Criterion and the Divinity test. So we have
achieved an interesting result: when individuals, and in particular higher
types, can not access to a suitable education level, then education does not
provide any explanation to wage di®erentials, at least in this class of models.
Moreover in a pooling equilibrium a part of the more able individuals "ability
rents"11 is redistributed to the less able ones, since the latter get a higher
wage than in a separating equilibrium. In other words we assist to a typical
market failure operating as a tax on high-skill individuals accruing to low-
skill ones under the form of a subside.
But this is not the unique theoretical embarrassment; let us come back
to our example beginning from the ¹ e > e¤ case. In such a case a pooling
equilibrium could be respresented by the bold dot in Figure 2 on the 1.5
ray; yet such an equilibrium can be easily breaked down. If we show as
u¤(t) the utility achieved by type t in equilibrium, it is easy to note that
u¤(1) < u(1;e1;e1); i.e. type 1 has an incentive to deviate from the pooling
equilibrium. She prefers reveal herself as a low-skill worker and receive the
"right" ¯rm response to such a signal. In other words, we obtain a separating
equilibrium once more. Such a result is still possible to the extent that
¹ e makes type 1 indi®erent between e1 and ¹ e; i.e. until to ¹ e = e¤: Let us
consider Figure 3:
10See Proposition 4.1 page 395.
11I mute this terminology from Stiglitz, 1975.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 12
Figure 3
In such a situation, type 1 is indi®erent between separating herself at e1
or pooling at ¹ e; type 2 is worse o® in any other situation than ¹ e12: Hence
signalling ¹ e is more important for type 2 than type 1; in other words, ¹ e
is strictly preferred by type 2 so as we can assign weight one to the belief
that ¹ e is coming from a type 213. According to such a reasoning, we can
conclude that Figure 3 represents a separating equilibrium but it represents
the frontier for the separating equilibria set. At the left of ¹ e only pooling
equilibria are possible; let us consider indeed the bold box in ¯gure 2, viz
for ¹ e = e¤
2: In such a situation only a pooling equilibrium is possible at the
maximum feasible signal ¹ e14:
Summing up, depending on the ¹ e value, it is possible identify either a
separating or a pooling equilibrium; these equilibria sets are parametrized to
12It is worth recalling that the game does not allow pre-commitment among types.
13The argument follows from the Divinity criterion, as previously remarked.
14This is a case where the Cho-Sobel proposition 4.1 applies.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 13
¹ e and, varying the latter, we obtain a continuum of equilibria spanning from
pooling to separating15.
So far, we have intentionally skipped any reference to the ¯rm best reply
to the type 21; now we are in for ¯lling the gap. In a separating equilibrium
- as, for example, the one depicted in ¯gure 2 where type 1 chooses e1 and
type 21 chooses the maximum feasible signal ¹ e - type 21 is rightly identi¯ed
as a high-skill worker but the ¯rm best reply can not be w = 2¹ e, since
in this case type 1 has an incentive to deviate. In such a stituation the
¯rm best reply is ¯x a wage level which is compatible with the type 21
preferences, as for example a wage ¹ w corresponding to the circled bold dot
in Figure 2. Note that such a wage level is lower than the one type 21
should receive: ¹ w < 2¹ e; nonetheless this is the best that both players can
do. The presence of a constraint on the type 21 signals set; jointly to the
presence of a type 1, produces an ine±cency in the job market in sense that
type 21 workers are paid less than their productivity; ¯rms hiring this kind of
worker attain positive pro¯ts in equilibrium thanks to the minor ability rents
accruing to the 21 workers. Moreover if there exists, as previously assumed,
a second high-skill worker who can freely chooses the properly separating
education level, then another theoretical embarrassment arises as a result of
the presence of two equally productive individuals but receiving a di®erent
earning: If we assume that the economy consists of two sectors, one using
low-skill and the other one high-skill workers, then in the "high-tech" sector
¯rms strictly prefers type 21 to 22 since the former owns the same skill level
but she is willing to accept a lower wage than her productivity level, since
she can not do better.
It is clear that in such a situation no ¯rm demands for type 22: The
only way for 22 not to be expelled from the labour market is to mime type
21 behaviour, but then the only separating equilibrium surviving is the one
characterized by the bundles (e1;e1) for type 1 and (2¹ e ¡ ±; ¹ e) for both types
2, where ± is a part of the more able workers ability rents accruing to the
¯rms because of the presence of rationed individuals.
The results obtained underlines that, when inequalities in accessing to
education are introduced in the Signalling approach, then this theoretical
scheme arises a series of market failures characterized by redistributive e®ects
among players. When pooling equilibria are met, then there is a partial
transfer of ability rents from more able to less able individuals. Even worse,
15In other words, the Nash equilibria set for such a game is connected.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 14
in such a case the signalling approach fails to provide an explanation to
earning distribution. Viceversa, when separating equilibria operates, under
the assumptions above mentioned, the recipients of the redistributive e®ect
are the ¯rms. In both cases, in the economy some workers receive an earning
which is less than their productivity.
4 The Macroeconomic point of view
The previous section underlined that the result of a perfect separating equi-
librium in the theoretical microeconomic model lies in the idea that educa-
tion is a type of commodity that individuals can purchase in any desired
amount; more able individuals gain from separating in any situation, since
a pooling equilibrium operates a private redistribution from them to the
less able agents. In order to avoid this market failure more able individ-
uals are willing to send the highest possible signal16. But if the latter is
not su±cient to prevent miming by the less able individuals, then pooling
equilibria can arise, as we have seen; moreover, also if separating operates,
in presence of a constrained high-skill individual it involves some unpleasent
characteristics which greatly reduce the real application of such a theoretical
scheme. Slightly changes in the basic assumptions lead to private redistribu-
tions among players. In a pooling equilibrium surviving the mentioned Nash
re¯nement, more able individuals get a lower wage than their productivity
and viceversa for the low-skill ones; the former pay a tax on their "ability
rents" which is translated to the latter. In a separating equilibrium with ra-
tioned agents instead a part of the more able individuals ability rents accrues
to the ¯rms.
In this ¯nal paragraph, we shall underline some macroeconomic conse-
quences of the signalling approach. In the microeconomic model used so
far, a t-type individual who studies e has a value te for the ¯rm, where t is
the individual ability. Although education does not a®ect the latter at all,
a sort of learning by doing is at work here, since individuals productivity
depends both on t and on e: More precisely, the signalling device involves a
"by-product" to the extent that more able individuals must invest in educa-
tion in order to be properly separated; the ¯nal result is that they are more
productive not only because they are more able but also because they stay
16For such a reason, the measure of the signals set is increasing in the type, as previously
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longer at school. From this point of view, the learning component produces
a scale e®ect in the aggregate production as consequence of the signalling
device. If argument of a social utility function were the level of GDP, then
any policy increasing the amount of education necessary to provide a fully
separating mechanism should be considerated. For example an increase in
the minimal attendancy age for schooling would force the less able types
to accumulate more education which in turn would induce more able types
to increase their signal in order to be separated . Nevertheless the positive
shift would produce an over-signalling (there is too much education) which
would make worse o® both types. In this case the private and social return
to education will be di®erent. But such a conclusion needs further consid-
erations; in fact, as Stiglitz underlines, the wages accruing to the types "are
best thought to be lifetime incomes, i.e. present discounted values of wage
streames"17. Although individuals would prefer a lower wage, they are un-
doubtedly richer and if intergenerational transfers are at the work, they make
the whole stream of future generations better endowded, operating a utility
redistribution from the current generation to the future ones.
From a macroeconomic point of view, a perfect signalling - hereafter iden-
ti¯ed with the model of paragraph 2 - increases the aggregate output, since it
establishes a monotonically increasing relationship between individual ability
and amount of education, e(t); e0(t) > 0; where t is the individual ability.






where T ½ <+ is the types set and ¼(t) the relative numerosity of type
t in the workers population. It is clear that if the separating device does
not work at all e(t) = ¹ e 2 (e1;eT); then Q = ¹ e
R
T t¼(t)dt < Qs where
¹ e 2 (e1;eT) is a common education level chosen by types as "best reply"
to the mean wage rate
R
T t¼(t)dt o®ered by the ¯rm. Moreover, in such a
situation, the earnings distribution collapses to a Dirac-delta function, i.e. to
a zero dispersion function around ¹ e. On the other side, the separating device
induces the highest dispersion among earnings and the direct consequence of
such an unpleasent result is that more able individuals have a major weight
in the aggregate output.
17Stiglitz, 1975, page 284.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 16
There is hence a trade-o® between e±cency and equality; the presence of
a fully separating mechanism involves the highest degree of e±cency, since
there is no redistribution of ability rents among types, but the highest vari-
ance among wages. On the other hand, the absence of such a device induce
a loss in e±cency, with an implicit tax burdening on more able types and
accruing to less skilled individuals, but it is characterized by a perfectly
egalitarian distribution.
In paragraph 3 we pointed out on the e®ects of inequalities in accessing
to school for underlining some weaknesses of the theoretical scheme. Now
we are going to point out the role played by others macroeconomic factors in
conditionating the functioning of the signalling device. We depart from the
consideration that the microeconomic model lies on a set of assumptions like:
i) individuals have free access to schooling, or alternatively, they can purchase
any amount of education which is required by their optimal program; ii)
individuals are perfectly informed about their types; iii) players know the
game rules, i.e. the opponent adopted inferential process; iv) there exists
no uncertainty about the transmission of the information so that signals are
correctly decoded by the receiver (noiseless communication); v) the quality of
the signal is homogenous over the types, viz. there exist no types signalling
better than others.
This kind of assumptions, and in particular points iv) and v), leave out
many relevant questions concerning di®erences in individuals related to the
socio-economic as well as parental context - where the individual was born
and grew up - which is composed by a a series of local and parental ex-
ternalities that do a®ect individual aptitudes. Sex, race, parental income,
place of birth, quality of schooling, di®erences in access to school are only
a few of the exogenous factors a®ecting the relationship between individual
ability and education18; hereafter we appeal such external factors as "¯eld
e®ects". It is clear that such factors introduce a noise component in the
transmission of the information at a macroeconomic level, and in general we
can have di®erent levels of signalling spanning from a low-e±cency signalling
mechanism, where some types are not able to be properly identi¯ed, to a
perfect signalling device, as the one we have seen in paragraph 2. In other
words the reduction, by the schooling, of the uncertainty related to the actual
18For a more detailed discussion about the role played by these exogenous factors in
explaining the empirical ¯ndings about the nexus wage-education, see Andrew Weiss,
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individual ability is depending, at di®erent stages, on the above mentioned
macroeconomic factors.
In general we can describe the signalling device as a system characterized
by a sending and a receiving "equipment" communicating through a noisy
channell; it is not possible to observe directly the state of the sending device
and such information has to be inferred decoding the received signal. To
¯t such assumptions into our scheme we identify the receving device with
the observed education level while the sending one represents the individual
ability. Hereafter, we mean with E the amount of education that can be
observed in a certain community; E assumes discrete values "j > 0; j =
1;2;:::n with probability rj. Likewise the individual ability, T, can assume
discrete values ti;i = 1;2;:::n, with probability pi: We assume that, in a
noiseless communication, the observed education level provides a complete
information about the individual ability, viz. E is equivalent to T from
an informative point of view (perfect signalling). The quantity H(X) =
¡
P
iÁilogÁi = ¡E [logÁi] de¯nes the Shannon's entropy of the system X;
i.e. the degree of uncertainty characterizing X: The latter depends both on
the number of X states (n) and on the related probabilities Ái. Likewise,
H(E;T) = ¡E [logP(E;T)] is the joint entropy of the system (E;T) under
investigation, where P(¢;¢) is the joint distribution.
By the entropy it is possible to quantify the information necessary to
reveal completely the state of a system:
IX = H(X) ¡ 0
that is, the quantity of information gained by the complete knowledge of the
system X;(H(X) = 0), is equal to the entropy of the system itself.
In our case, we do not observe directly the source of the signal, T, but
the receiver E, and we are interested to the following question: How much
information on T is it contained in E? Before to provide an answer we
need a bit of terminology. We de¯ne the conditional entropy H(Y j xi)
as the entropy of the system Y when the system X is in the xi state, i.e.
the uncertainty degree of Y after the revelation on X. Likewise we de¯ne
H(Y j X) =
P
i piH(Y j xi) the total conditional entropy. This kind of
measure plays a crucial role in our problem since it represents the entropy
of Y "destroyed" by X: With a bit of probabilistic calculus it is easy to see
that the following relationship holds:
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If X and Y were independent, then H(Y j X) = H(Y ) and the entropy of
the joint system would be just the sum of the single entropies. From here, let
us conclude that, in general, the joint entropy can never be higher than the
sum of the single entropies: H(Y;X) · H(X) + H(y), since the uncertainty
degree of the joint system can not increase with the revelation on a single
component. The conditional entropy provides an interesting instrument to
analyze the informative power of education relatively to individuals ability,
allowing us to identify the amount of information on T contained in E, IE!T:
The latter is de¯ned as:
IE!T = H(T) ¡ H(T j E) (3)
The rationale of the above equation is quite simple: before of observing the
E system, the entropy of T is H(T); when the data on E are available the
entropy about T reduces to H(T j E); IE!T represents the entropy which
is destroyed by the communication and H(T j E) the residual one. By
de¯nition, IE!T is the total information about T contained in E. Moreover it
is possible show that IE!T = IT!E; i.e. H(T)¡H(T j E) = H(E)¡H(E j T):
When two systems are equivalent the information is at the maximum
value: IE!T = H(T) and the residual entropy is zero. This case corresponds
to a perfect signalling or communication. When the transmission is a®ected
by noise, it is interesting to have an idea about the revelating power of the
education in such a context and, if possible, to identify conditions which
make IE!T a maximum. At ¯rst glance it seems that this kind of approach,
although using a similar probabilistic framework, is rather di®erent from
the signalling model we have discussed in paragraph 2 and 3, since now we
are "testing" the informative process as a whole, taking into consideration
for every communication engaging the joint system, rather than analyze the
strategic interaction between individual and ¯rm. Nevertheless it is worth
noting that we are assuming that, in absence of noise, the educational sys-
tem provides a complete information about the individual ability, hence that
the microfoundation provided by the Spence's model is perfectly compatible
with such a macroeconomic approach to the problem. Our task is simply
to investigate the role played by the noise component, induced by the ¯eld
e®ects, in the signalling functioning.
In order to apply the (3) we need to calculate the conditional entropy;
the latter is the average of the partial conditional entropies H(T j E = "j).
Indicating with P(T = ti j E = "j) the (conditional) probability that the
received signal "j originates from a source ti, we obtain a system:M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 19
H(T j E = "j) = ¡
X
iP(Ti j E = "j)logP(Ti j E = "j) j = 1;2;:::n
It is clear that any of such entropies depends on the noise a®ecting the
communication; moreover the total conditional entropy H(T j E)=
P
j pjH(T j
E = "j) depends only on the distribution law - hence on the moments - of
the noise and not on the entropy characterizing the single systems. In other
words, whatever the uncertainty degree of the "transmission equipment" the
quality of the information depends only on the noise magnitude. If the latter
is remarkable then the observation of the education level provides a poor indi-
cation about individual ability, even if the "equipment" is properly working,
i.e. the players strategies are correct.
To make clearer the latter point we focus on two types only, t1;t2; and
two corresponding education levels, e1;e2: In absence of noise, E reveals com-
pletely T, i.e. e1 ! t1;e2 ! t2; the error probability in decoding the signal
is ¹: We have four conditional probabilities: P(e1 j t1) = 1 ¡ ¹;P(e1 j t2) =
¹;P(e2 j t1) = ¹;P(e2 j t2) = 1 ¡ ¹: The total conditional base-2 entropy
is19:
H(E j T) = ¡[¹log2¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)log2(1 ¡ ¹)]
As noted, the lack of information depends only on the noise probability ¹
while it is indipendent on the a-priori entropy characterizing the system. The
quantity of information that E provides on T; in presence of noise, is then:
IE!T = ¡rlog2r ¡ (1 ¡ r)log2(1 ¡ r) ¡ [¡¹log2¹¡ (1 ¡ ¹)log2(1 ¡ ¹)]
where r is the a-prior probability to receive e1. The quantity of information
provided by E describes a saddle in the space [0;1]
2-<+: For a given ¹, IE!T
achieves an interior maximum for r = 1=2; i.e. for the maximum entropy of
E. In this case we obtain:
IE!T = 1 ¡ [¡¹log2¹ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)log2(1 ¡ ¹)]
where the term into the square brackets represents the lack of information
due to the noise. If for example ¹ = 1=2, i.e. the maximum noise possible,
then the lack of information is total: IE!T = 0.
19Since the transmission is composed by two "digits"- t1;t2 - it is useful adopt the base
2 for the logaritmic operator.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 20
This simple example illustrates how the signalling process depends both
on the receiver entropy level and the noise probabilities and, for such a reason,
a wide range of situations arise, spanning from a poor informative process to
a good one. Even if E provides a perfect signalling in a noiseless situation,
the presence of ¯eld e®ects reduce drammatically the informative power of
education.
5 Conclusions
The goal of the paper was to analyze in depth the signalling explanation
to wage di®erentials as opposed to the human capital point of view. In
paragraph 2 we analyzed the game theory approach, underlining that only
separating equilibria do exist in such a game. In paragraph 3 we altered
a key assumption of the model by introducing some heterogeneity among
more able individuals, showing as inequality in accessing to school leads to
a serious problem of "market failure" in the model. Finally in paragraph 4
we have analyzed the signalling approach as macroeconomic extension to the
microeconomic problem.
It seems to me that three main conclusions arise. The ¯rst one concerns
inequalities in accessing to education; if a part of more able individuals can
not send the right amount of signal, then they su®er of a utility loss which
induces a redistributive e®ect to the ¯rms. The consequence is that each
more able individual, rationed and not, is underpaid with respect to her true
productivity. This kind of market failure a®ects both the private and the
social return to education, since a lower aggregate output follows. Moreover
it is not possible to rule out such a distorsion by subsidizing individuals,
since, because of the asymmetric information, we do not know, a-priori, the
recipients. Neither borrowing is able to solve out completely the problem,
since the borrower would be certainly able to attain the right amount of
education necessary to her for signalling, but in equilibrium we would have
two individuals characterized by an identical productivity but by a di®erent
satisfaction, since borrower gains the same wage of the non-rationed indi-
vidual but with an additional cost due to refund; also in this case there is
a redistributive e®ect of a share of the borrower ability rents to the lender,
despite the presence of a fully separating equilibrium. The only way to avoid
such a problem is to guarantee to everyone a free access to schooling. This
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in the economy does not arise beliefs according to which individuals coming
from private school are providing an implicit high-quality signal.
The second main point concerns the actual functioning of an educational
informative channell. There exist several external factors which can strongly
reduce this kind of communication at a macroeconomic level. When the
¯eld e®ects make noisy the communication of the individual ability through
schooling, the separating device does not work properly and more able indi-
viduals can be grouped with the less able ones and viceversa. Also in this
case there is not only a private e®ect but also a social one, since, as noted by
Stiglitz, 1975, a productive line composed by individuals with di®erent abil-
ities is less productive than two distinct lines characterized by homogenous
workers. The presence of ¯eld e®ects induce a wide range of possible missal-
locations of individuals into the right "slots", altering the sorting mechanism.
The third and last point takes into consideration the trade-o® between
e±cency and equity. Even if we believe in the sorting device, we can not ne-
glect this relevant by-product of the analysis. In an economy characterized by
fully separated individuals, which in turn calls for a large dispersion among
wages, the productive process is primarily driven by the high-skill individ-
uals, confering to them a preminent role in the economy. Moreover, being
them the principal recipients of the full operating of the sorting mechanism,
they will be naturally driven to invest a relevant GDP share in improving
the educational system. Such an e®ect produces an over-signalling e®ect re-
ducing e±cency and worsening the earning distribution. If intergenerational
transfers are at the work, then more able individuals tends to increase their
income over time, and the dynamics of the income distribution depends on
the initial conditions20.
The distributive question related to the earning distribution is particulary
relevant in the real economy. As underlined by Rebecca M. Blank21, during
the 80's, "wages for less-skilled workers declined steadily. Between 1983 and
1989, GDP growth of 1 percent was correlated with a $0.32 decline in weekly
wages for the poorest decile of the population....Among men with less than a
high school diploma who work full time all year, real weekly wages declined
22 percent between 1979 and 1993....In short, for the last 15 years, economic
growth has not been as powerful in ¯ghting poverty as it was in the past.
A possible explanation for such a result can be provided by the signalling
20Giannini, 1996.
21NBER Reporter, Fall 1996, page 11.M. Giannini - Education and Job Market Signalling: a Comment 22
approach, where more able individuals play a leading role in the production
process and consequently in the distributive one; although less-skilled workers
choose voulantarily a low education level according to their preferences, if
signalling works fully, they tend to be marginalized by the growth process
which is primarily driven by more able workers, getting a negligibale share
of GDP growth.
The more the signalling is noisy, the more the distributive process is
biased since individuals are erroneously sorted; in such a case not only the
market fails to allocate workers according to their real ability, but it creates
additional inequalities.
In conclusion, the signalling approach to the explanation of wage dif-
ferentials arises several questions related to the real functioning of such a
thereotical scheme; inequality in accessing to school and the presence of ¯eld
e®ects reduce remarkably the possibility that a signalling device works prop-
erly. Obviously this does not mean that it does not operate at all, nor that
it contains only an abstract meaning, but simply that the utility of such
an approach in understanding wage di®erentials can be greately reduced by
several factors, some of which are not under control neither by the market
nor by the economist.
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